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The “Hegemonic Presidency” in African Politics 
 
George Klay Kieh, Jr., University of West Georgia 
 
Abstract: The post-colonial era in Africa has witnessed the emergence of the “hegemonic presidency,” which has 
been variously referred to as the “imperial presidency” and the “Big man/Big woman syndrome.” Essentially, the 
phenomenon entails the illegal exercise of presidential powers beyond both the constitutional and statutory 
boundaries. Against this background, this article examines three major interrelated issues. First, it interrogates the 
historical development of the phenomenon. Second, it probes the factors that have caused the emergence of the 
“hegemonic presidency.” Third, the study suggests some ways in which the phenomenon may be curtailed. In the 
case of the historical development of the phenomenon, the “hegemonic presidency” has its roots in colonialism, 
especially the ubiquity and the unfettered exercise of power by the chief colonial administrator—e.g. the governor-
general.  As for the major causes of the phenomenon, they include the constitution, statutes, weak public institutions, 
especially the legislature and the judiciary, and the acts of ultra vires, which are consequences of presidential 
arrogation of power. Finally, the article suggests various ways for curtailing the phenomenon, including 
constitutional redesign to limit the appointive and financial powers of the presidency and the strengthening of public 
institutions, particularly the legislative and judicial branches, so that they can play their effective rules as 
countervailing forces. 
 
Keywords: Hegemonic presidency, imperial presidency, Big man/Big woman syndrome, African politics, 
colonialism, constitution 
 
Introduction 
Since the dawn of the post-colonial era in Africa in the 1950s, the “hegemonic presidency” has 
become an enduring fixture on the continent’s political landscape. That is, the presidency has 
become the dominant institution in African politics by wielding tremendous unfettered powers 
that span the broad gamut of the public sector—from unbridled control of the “national purse” to 
expansive appointive powers. Both the ubiquity and the dominance of the president led Jackson 
and Rosberg (1982: ii) to refer to the typical African president as a “prince, autocrat, prophet and 
tyrant.” Significantly, the suzerainty of the presidency over political power has witnessed the 
corresponding weakening of the legislative and judicial branches that are supposed to serve as 
countervailing forces in providing “horizontal accountability.” In other words, the growth of the 
“hegemonic presidency” has created a “zero-sum framework” in which the increase in 
presidential powers leads to a decrease in legislative and judicial powers and the broader 
weakening of all other public institutions. 
Interestingly, the emergence of the “third wave of democratization,” and the resulting 
liberalization of politics in 1990, raised hopes that the “hegemonic presidency” would be caged, 
as democratizing African states made the transition from political systems based on personal rule 
(Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; Hyden, 2012) to those based on formal norms embodied in 
constitutions and statutes. However, the hopes have been dashed as the “hegemonic presidency” 
has remained ensconced on the African political landscape, due to its resilience and adaptability 
(Tull and Simons, 2017). Prempeh (2008a:63) puts the case this way: “However, despite the 
recent democratic backlash against decades of authoritarian presidential rule in Africa, and the 
regime change this has wrought in several African states, the phenomenon of the ‘imperial 
presidency,’ long associated with politics and government in Africa, persists.” 
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Against this background, this paper seeks to address four major questions. First, what 
factors and forces have shaped the historical development of the “hegemonic presidency” in 
Africa? Second, what are the nature and dynamics of the phenomenon? Third, what are the major 
causes of the phenomenon—what are the major axles? Fourth, how can the pathologies of the 
“hegemonic presidency” be addressed? 
 
Literature Review 
Leon (2010) posits that the initial three decades of the post-independence era in Africa were 
marked by what he calls “the specter of one-party states, ‘presidents for life,’ violent usurpations 
of power either through assassinations or military coups” (Leon, 2010: 2). He notes further that 
these political developments revolved around an “imperial presidency” that was anchored on the 
personalization of power, the suppression of human rights, and predation.  In addition, he 
observes that “imperial presidents” on the African continent were entrenched in power. For 
example, by the end of the 1980s, only six of the approximately 150 presidents who had ruled 
various African states voluntarily relinquished power, howbeit, after tenures in excess of 20 
years. 
Prempeh (2008a) asserts that the phenomenon is rooted in “aspects of the post-colonial 
history and the evolution of the African state; and in aspects of the constitutional design and 
politics in Africa’s new democracies” (764).  Moreover, he posits that, even in this era of the 
“third wave of democratization,” presidential suzerainty persists because of the continuation of 
the practice of the centralization of power at the national level, weak legislatures and courts and 
other public institutions, and presidential monopoly over the control of public financial resources 
(Prempeh, 2008a: 820). 
Similarly, Igwe (2011) argues that the “imperial presidency” in Africa is mainly powered 
by presidential control over the financial, material, and logistical resources of the state. Using 
this position of dominance, he notes that the “imperial presidency” has then created a vast 
patron-client network. Operationally, the “imperial president” serves as the chief patron and is 
assisted by a coterie of national and local pro-consuls, who serve as the intermediaries with 
ordinary citizens. Particularly, given the pervasiveness of mass poverty in Africa, these patron-
client networks have become the sources of survival for ordinary citizens. Ultimately, these 
ordinary citizens have been trapped by a dependent relationship with the “imperial presidency.” 
In the same vein, Hyden (2012) posits that several key elements are pivotal to sustaining 
the “hegemonic presidency” in Africa. The pivot is the establishment of reciprocal relations 
between the president, the chief patron, and his or her coteries of lieutenants, followers, and 
clients. Another factor is that access to resources by the president’s vast clientelist network is the 
glue that holds the relationships together. Essentially, the “clients and followers expect 
something in return for their loyalty” (Hyden, 2012:104). 
Ronning (2010) examines the phenomenon of the “Big man” by using various 
“hegemonic presidents”—Dos Santos (the former President of Angola), Afwerki (the President 
of Eritrea), Mugabe (the deposed President of Zimbabwe), Zenawi (the late Prime Minister of 
Ethiopia), and Museveni (the President of Uganda)—as case studies. He then argues that the 
foundational pillar of these “Big men” is anchored on the fact that they “are too willing to use 
undemocratic means to silence their vocal opponents” (Ronning, 2010; 13). In other words, the 
use of repression is crucial to the maintenance of presidential hegemony. 
Using Cameroon as a case study, Fru Doh (2008:155) postulates that the “Big man 
syndrome” in Cameroonian politics, as personified by the presidency, “is a gorgon that was 
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inherited from the colonial administrations…” Functionally, according to Fru Doh, the 
“hegemonic presidency” in the country has been notorious for fostering a culture of corruption 
and graft, amid neglected human needs. In other words, while the hegemonic president and his 
clients have used various corrupt means to accumulate wealth, they have paid very little attention 
to the needs of the majority of Cameroonians. The resulting effect is that the institution is 
despised and unpopular with the majority of the citizens of the country.  
Amutabi (2009) probes the travails of the “hegemonic presidency” in Kenya. 
Specifically, he asserts that the phenomenon is shaped by two major sets of factors: ethnicity and 
partisanship. In the case of the former, presidential hegemons, such as Kenyatta, Moi, and 
Kibaki, used the dominant Kikuyu ethnic group as a major anchor of presidential dominance. In 
the latter case, the three former presidents employed the vast party machinery—Kenyatta and 
Moi used the Kenyan African National Union (KANU), while Kibaki used the “DP and its 
subsequent metamorphoses as NARC, PNU, etc.”(Amutabi, 2009:56). 
          Treading on the same path, Isumonah (2012) interrogates the dynamics of the “imperial 
presidency” in the specific context of Nigeria. Broadly, he observes that the phenomenon has 
undermined the legal and other formal guarantees for political competition and participation in 
the country (Isumonah, 2012: 43). Using the Obasanjo regime as the case study, he postulates 
that the pivots were presidential domination of the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP), the 
Independent Electoral Commission (INEC), and the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (EFCC).  
Fombad and Nwauche (2012) examined some of the major effects of what they termed 
“presidential absolutism” on democratic governance in Africa (Fombad and Nwauche, 2012:91). 
They conclude that, by and large, conventional constitutional checks have not succeeded in 
curbing the excesses of the “imperial presidency.” One of the resultant effects has been the abuse 
of power with impunity by various presidents. 
For their part, Tull and Simons (2017) interrogated whether term limits, as by-products of 
constitutional design and engineering during the “third wave of democratization,” have served as 
constraints on the “hegemony presidency” in Africa. According to their findings, term limits 
have not help to cage the “hegemonic presidency.” The main reason is that the “hegemonic 
presidency” has demonstrated the “strong capacities of adaptation to changing environments” 
(Tull and Simons, 2017:96). Particularly, even in the era of the “third wave of democratization,” 
the “hegemonic presidents” have maintained power even through legal means. For example, they 
have used terms limits, which were ostensibly designed to constrain their excesses, as 
instruments of domination, including in “[strengthening] their power vis-à-vis both outside 
donors and local foes” (Tull and Simons, 2017:96). 
 
Theoretical Framework 
Drawing from the literature reviewed and the broader corpus of scholarly works on the 
“hegemonic” or imperial presidency,” the study designed a theoretical framework of the 
“hegemonic presidency” as the analytical compass. The framework has several interrelated 
elements. The historical context dimension is anchored on the argument that the “hegemonic 
presidency” is the by-product of both colonialism and post-colonialism. The former is rooted in 
what Ake (1996:2-3) calls the traditions of the “totalistic state”—a construct that exercised 
unbridled power over virtually every sector of society. In the case of the latter, the foundations 
are the authoritarian civilian and military regimes that adorned the political landscape of the 
African continent from the 1960s to 1990. The “third wave of democratization” is stymied by 
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these historical antecedents of the “imperial presidency,” because the post-colonial state has not 
been democratically reconstituted—a comprehensive and transformative process covering the 
nature, character, mission, political economy, policies and sectors of society. 
Another element concerns the nature and dynamics of the phenomenon. In terms of its 
nature, the “hegemonic” or “imperial presidency” revolves around the exercise of unchecked 
powers that makes the presidency into what Eagle (2012:1) calls a “monarchy.” The ancillaries 
are the preponderance of power (both constitutional and extra-constitutional), executive 
supremacy (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; Prempeh, 2008a; Prempeh, 2008b), arbitrariness, and 
the mythology of presidential “omnipotence, omnipresence and omniscience.” The dynamics 
entail the operational pivots of the phenomenon—the subordination of the other public 
institutions (legislature, judiciary and the public bureaucracy) to the presidency, the usurpation of 
law-making powers, unfettered control over the “public’s purse,” the ubiquity of “presidential 
directives” (Prempeh, 2008a; Prempeh, 2008b), and the suzerainty over patronage and “pork” 
(government-dispensed largesse). 
The major axles or drivers of the phenomenon are the political culture, constitutional 
design, weak public institutions, legislative acquiescence and abdication of responsibilities to the 
presidency, presidential control over the financial, material, and logistical resources of the state, 
mass poverty and the resulting reliance on government largess, expansive presidential appointive 
powers, presidential control over the ruling party, ineffective opposition parties, and the 
realpolitik-based foreign policies of the major global powers, like the United States, France and 
China. At a particular historical juncture or moment, one or more of these axles or drivers may 
be ascendant (Agbese, 2007). However, in such a case, although the others may be dormant, they 
are present (Agbese, 2007).      
 
Conceptualizing the “Hegemonic Presidency” 
The concept of the “hegemonic presidency” is used interchangeably with the terms “imperial 
presidency” and the “Big man/Big woman syndrome.”  Drawing from Schlesinger’s (1973) 
seminal study on the “imperial presidency” in the United States,” the “hegemonic presidency” is 
conceptualized as a phenomenon that is characterized by a president deliberately stretching the 
boundaries and exceeding the legal limits—constitutional and statutory—of his or her powers, by 
particularly abusing the authority through unlawful actions. 
 
Historicizing the “Hegemonic Presidency” in Africa 
The Pre-“Third Wave of Democratization” Era (1950s-1990) 
The “hegemonic presidency” has its roots in colonialism, especially the character of the 
“Berlinist state.” The core of the character of the “Berlinist state” was absolutism. As an 
absolutist construct, the “Berlinist state” controlled virtually every aspect of life—cultural, 
economic, political, religious, and social. There were several derivatives from the core of the 
“Berlinist state.” A critical one was the control of access to resources. As Berman (1998:313) 
notes, “The state in colonial Africa, within the broader context of the intrusion of capitalist 
modernity was the central institutional force in the organization, production and distribution of 
social resources.” Another tenet was the centrality of the use of repression as the dominant 
method for inducing compliance from the colonized.  Linked to this was the disdain for popular 
participation that the functionaries of the “Berlinist state” demonstrated toward the colonized. 
Also, the governor-general model was the framework for rulership. Under the model, executive, 
legislative, and judicial powers were in reality fused in the governor-generalship. In other words, 
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the governor-general exercised law-making, law enforcement, and law adjudication powers even 
in those cases where colonial legislative assemblies and courts existed. The critical pivot was 
that the governor-general exercised unchecked powers and, consequently, operated above the 
law. 
Drawing from the colonial legacy, the “hegemonic presidency” became a pervasive 
feature of the various authoritarian regimes that adorned the landscape of the African continent 
during the initial three decades of the post-colonial era. Jackson and Rosberg (1982:1) referred to 
the emergent all-powerful presidents as “prince, autocrat, prophet and tyrant.” In this vein, as 
part of the tragedy of the “hegemonic presidency,” the presidents of various African states 
arrogated unto themselves multiple roles to accentuate their statuses as the “big men:” the chief 
administrative officer, the chief legislative officer, the chief judicial officer, the chief financial 
officer, and the chief procurement officer of the government (Sawyer, 2005: 20-22). 
The emergent “hegemonic presidency” was rationalized by its apologists as an imperative 
for both nation-building and state-building. In the case of the former, the central argument was 
that given the fact that virtually all of the independent African states were multi-ethnic societies, 
a strong presidency was therefore required to mediate the competing ethnic agendas and the 
resulting conflicts. In addition, the argument was made that in the aforementioned context the 
strong presidency was critical to the promotion of national integration, peace, and stability. In the 
latter case, the rationale was that the “hegemonic presidency” was indispensable to the 
promotion of socio-economic development. This was because the complexity of the 
developmental process, especially the challenges that are usually posed by various competing 
interests, required the leadership of a strong president who could adroitly use the confluence of 
“sticks and carrots” to tame the forces and factors that were inimical to national development. 
  In order to perform their twin roles as the anchors of national integration and the motor 
forces of national development, some of the first generation “hegemonic presidents” developed 
personality cults. For example, Jomo Kenyatta (Kenya) was referred to as Mzee, Kwame 
Nkrumah (Ghana) was known as Osagyefo, and Julius Nyerere (Tanzania) as Mwalimu. Over 
time, these personality cults elevated the respective “hegemonic presidents,” as well as others, to 
the level of deities, who personified the state. In justifying this outcome, the late President 
Leopold Senghor of Senegal argued, “[T]he president personifies the nation as did the monarch 
of former times the peoples. The masses are not mistaken who speak of the ‘reign’ of Modibo 
Keita (Mali), Sekou Toure (Guinea) and Houphouet Boigny (Cote d’Ivoire), in whom they [saw] 
above  all else, the elected of God through the people” (Meredith, 2005:162). President 
Senghor’s assertion was from the “play book” of King Louis XVI of France, who boldly 
declared, “I am the state” (Bent, 1887).  Also, the claim is grounded in the ancien “divine rule,” 
which was the contrived basis for monarchical rule in Europe.   
Over time, the “hegemonic presidency” did not promote integration, development, and 
democracy. In fact, the “hegemonic presidency,” for example, became the primary source for the 
promotion of ethnic division by, among other things, according preferential treatment to 
particular ethnic groups that were connected to the president. Eventually, various African states 
became what Mengisteab (2007: 108) calls “ethnic states.”  
     On the development front, some of the “hegemonic presidents,” like Nkrumah and Nyerere, 
made some laudable efforts to promote socio-economic development by the government, for 
example, investing in public education, public health, and the infrastructure—the construction of 
roads, bridges, etc. However, hamstrung by monocrop economies that revolved around the 
production of a single major raw material—agricultural products, minerals, and oil—as well as 
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other domestic factors, and a hostile global political economy, the development agenda got 
derailed. 
On the democracy front, virtually all African states, with the exception of Botswana and 
Mauritius, became authoritarian (Freedom House, 2017). For example, with the “hegemonic 
presidency” as the main driver, political rights and civil liberties were violated with impunity, 
one party rule became the modal system of governance, and elections became charades that were 
designed for regime legitimation. In terms of elections, there were sixteen nominally contested 
ones on the African Continent from 1960-1989 (Posner and Young, 2007: 131). Only one 
incumbent president lost—Aden Abdullah Osman of Somalia was defeated by challenger 
Abdirashid Ali Shermake in the country’s 1967 presidential election (Posner and Young, 2007: 
131). Also, some African Presidents, like Kamuzu Banda of Malawi, became “presidents for 
life” (Nwabueze, 1974).  
Cumulatively, the “hegemonic presidency” exercised unfettered powers over a broad 
range of policy areas, including the police, internal security, the economy, land allocation, and 
state corporations (Eagle, 2012:1). Simultaneously, the other public institutions, like the 
legislature and the judiciary, became peripheral players in national decision-making. The late 
Ivorian President Houphouet Boigny makes the point more poignantly when he asserts, “There’s 
no number two or three or four…in Cote d’Ivoire… [T]here’s only number one, that’s me and I 
don’t share my decisions” (Meredith, 2005: 368-369).  
 
The “Third Wave of Democratization” Epoch (1990-Present)   
The sustained efforts by the various reform movements on the African continent reached their 
crescendo in 1990, as the “garrison state” that had served as the major wall of defense for the 
various authoritarian regimes broke down. Beginning with the demonstration by students in 
Algeria in 1988, the struggles for political and socio-economic reforms on the continent spread 
like an epidemic, ushering in the “third wave of democratization” on the continent (Nzongola-
Ntalaja, 1997). In some of the former French colonies, like Benin, Mali, and Niger, for example, 
the reform movements, using the “sovereign national conference” as the instrument for 
promoting change, wrestled away the control of state power from the various authoritarian 
regimes (Le Vine, 2004). Subsequently, transitional modalities, including the drafting of a new 
constitution, the establishment of a multiparty system, and the removal of the shackles of 
political repression, were formulated and set into motion. Ultimately, multiparty elections were 
held, and new governments were elected with the right to govern derived from the people. 
More than two decades later, major progress has been made in the political domain. For 
example, multipartyism has become the major tapestry for the legal contestation of power, and 
competitive elections the dominant modes for choosing leaders. In addition, the phenomenon of 
“president for life” has become a relic of the past. This is evidenced by the fact that term limits 
have become major vehicles for checkmating presidential tenure (although some presidents, like 
Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, succeeded in removing terms limit from the constitution, so that he 
could run for an unlimited number of terms). 
  However, in spite of the laudable strides that have been made in the area of political 
democratization, including the emergence of several democratizing states on the continent, the 
“hegemonic presidency” has remained ensconced on the political landscape. In fact, the 
“hegemonic presidency” has been unaffected by the wave of political and legal reforms.  
Prempeh (2008b: 110) provides an excellent summation of the staying power of the “hegemonic 
presidency,” amid the “third wave of democratization” on the African continent: 
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Africa’s current presidents may be term-limited, but by all 
accounts they have not yet been tamed… In fact, the modal 
African presidency has emerged from the recent round of 
democratic reforms with extant powers substantially intact…power 
in the African state, and with its control of resources and 
patronage, continues to rest with the president, making the capture 
and control of the presidency the singular ambition of African 
politicians. 
 
Several major factors account for the continuing existence of the “hegemonic 
presidency,” even in the continent’s democratizing states. The overarching factor is that the 
broader democratization project that is the centerpiece of the “third wave” has focused more on 
the liberalization of the “political space” (reform), and less on the democratic reconstitution of 
the state (transformation). Accordingly, the “hegemonic presidency” has been sanitized, but not 
transformed. The latter process is what is required, given the history and resulting pedigree of the 
phenomenon.  
Another factor is that the elites, who led the various reform movements, were not 
interested in the transformation of the presidency. They saw nothing wrong with the “hegemonic 
presidency” as anathema to democratic governance; instead, they blamed the personalities who 
occupied the presidency. In other words, the reformers made the faulty determination that 
personalities rather than institutions matter. Therefore, a “democratic-minded person” who 
occupies the “hegemonic presidency” would then use the powers judiciously and prudently. But, 
the empirical evidence has not borne this out. In fact, the repository of evidence supports the 
view that institutions matter more than the individuals who occupy positions within them. In 
short, the focus needs to be on institutional transformation as part of the broader process of the 
democratic reconstitution of the state.  
Also, during the processes of constitutional design (new constitutions in the cases of 
some African states) and constitutional re-engineering (in the cases of other African states that 
made changes to existing constitutions), the “hegemonic presidency” was not transformed. In 
some cases, the presidency was given more powers. Hence, the constitutions of African states are 
major contributors to the continuation of the phenomenon.   
 
The Nature and Dynamics of the “Hegemonic Presidency” in Africa 
The Nature 
The overarching tenet of the nature of the “hegemonic presidency” is the exercise of unfettered 
powers. During the pre-“third wave of democratization” era (1950s-1990), African presidents, by 
and large, exercised unbridled power in virtually every sector of the state, including the political, 
economic, and social. For example, operating within the context of the one-party state (both de 
jure and de facto), presidents chose the candidates of the ruling party for the various nominal 
parliamentary and local elections. Eventually, the continuing political survival of these office 
holders, and their access to state resources through the process of primitive accumulation by 
using their respective offices to plunder and pillage the public treasury, receive bribes, and 
engage in sundry illegal activities, was dependent upon presidential whims. So, in order to 
remain in the good graces of the president, public officials refrained from serving as checks on 
the exercise of presidential power (horizontal accountability).  
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Also, presidential control over the coercive instruments of the state—the military, police, 
and security services—enabled the president to asphyxiate discussions and debates, both within 
the general public sphere, as well as within the government. This was done, for example, by 
harassing, intimidating, arresting, imprisoning, torturing, forcing into exile, and even killing the 
political opponents of various regimes across the continent. For example, the vitriolic abuses of 
political human rights by the Amin (Uganda), Mobutu (Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo), Barre (Somalia), and Doe (Liberia) regimes provide a repository of empirical 
evidence (Freedom House, 2017). 
Although the exercise of political rights and civil liberties in the democratizing states 
(Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, etc.) on the African continent is not stymied by the 
“hegemonic presidency” during the current “third wave of democratization” epoch, the resulting 
open public discussion and debates about various policy issues have not been able to check the 
unbridled exercise of presidential powers. This is because presidents are still able to use their 
control over states resources, expansive appointment powers, and the machinery of the ruling 
party, among others, to exercise unchecked powers. In other words, the liberalization of the 
“political space” in Africa’s democratizing states has not fundamentally altered the nature of the 
“hegemonic presidency.” In fact, the nature of the “hegemonic presidency” has survived the 
whirlwind of democratic reforms (Prempeh, 2008a; Prempeh, 2008b). 
In terms of the ancillaries, the preponderance of presidential powers, for example, is 
made possible by the constitutional design of various African states. For example, the Liberian 
Constitution gives the president expansive appointment powers. Under Article 54,  
 
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Senate 
appoint and commission: a) cabinet ministers, deputy and assistant 
ministers; b) ambassadors, ministers, consuls; and c) the Chief 
Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court and judges of 
subordinate courts; and d) superintendents, other county officials 
and other officials of other political sub-divisions; e) members of 
the military from the rank of lieutenant or its equivalent and above; 
f) marshals, deputy marshals; and sheriffs (Constitution of Liberia, 
1986). 
 
In addition, under Article 55, the president appoints and commissions notaries public and justices 
of the peace (Constitution of Liberia, 1986).  In addition, in 2008, the Supreme Court of Liberia 
ruled that the president of Liberia has the constitutional authority to appoint city mayors (Boweh, 
2008:1). In this vein, the president of Liberia virtually appoints all public officials, with the 
exception of legislators. Also, the executive supremacy dimension has led to, among others, the 
emergence of the executive as the first and dominant branch of the government. Based on this, 
the “hegemonic presidency” has been able to control, for example, the allocation of resources to 
both the legislative and judicial branches (Prempeh, 2008a: Prempeh, 2008b). The resulting 
dependence on the executive for resources has undermined the capacity of the legislative and 
judicial branches to serve as countervailing forces. Using its expansive constitutional powers and 
the tradition of executive supremacy, the “hegemonic presidency” is then able to govern, in part, 
based on arbitrariness. For example, there is the general tendency for some African presidents to 
make decisions that have law-making implications without first seeking legislative approval. 
Importantly, the nature of the “hegemonic presidency” is anchored on the mythology that the 
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president is an all-powerful (omnipotent) “Big man” or “Big woman,” is present everywhere 
(omnipresent) whether through the agency of state functionaries or “supernatural powers,” and 
knows everything about every subject (omniscient). 
Cumulatively, the nature of the “hegemonic presidency” enables the chief executive, 
whether in authoritarian, semi-authoritarian, or democratizing states, to, with some variations, 
exercise enormous unchecked powers. In some instances, this leads to presidential disregard for 
the constitution of the country. In such cases, as Fondong (2013:1) observes, “…[these leaders 
then] generally…conduct themselves as medieval emperors, who act with little  regard for the 
other branches of government, and who seem to be guided by the notion that the president is 
above the law, and what he [or she] orders is law.” 
 
The Dynamics 
Operationally, the “hegemonic presidency” functions in several general ways. A major one is the 
perennial practice of subordinating the other public institutions, especially the legislature, the 
judiciary, and the public bureaucracy, to the executive. This is done through the arrogation of 
presidential pre-eminence in the making and implementation of public policies. That is, the way 
public policy is both made and implemented tends to reflect the preferences of the president, 
even if it is determined to be inimical to the general interest and well-being of the citizenry. 
Another major way is the practice of presidents usurping the law-making functions of the 
legislature. As Prempeh (2008b:110) argues, “Presidents in contemporary Africa routinely 
pronounce ‘laws’ and announce major policy decisions without recourse to parliamentary 
legislation.” For example, in 1986, then Zambian President Frederick Chiluba declared the 
country a “Christian state” without amending the constitution’s secular and multi-religious 
provisions (Prempeh, 2008a; Prempeh, 2008b). In fact, interestingly, President Chiluba got his 
party-controlled parliament to give formal legal backing to his pronouncement after the fact. 
Using presidential control over the “public’s purse,” the “hegemonic president” spends 
the state’s money without the constitutionally required legislative approval. For example, during 
the Obasanjo regime in Nigeria (1999-2007), there were various expenditures without legislative 
approval under the nebulous practice of “anticipated budgetary approval” (BBC News, 2000).        
In other words, the state’s financial resources were expended for various reasons as determined 
by President Obasanjo on the basis that these expenditures would had been approved later by the 
National Assembly. This practice helped solidify the president’s control over the “public purse,” 
and undermined probity and accountability, two of the key planks of the democratic governance 
architecture. 
Also, the presidential directive—“government by press release”—remains a common 
mode of governing (Prempeh, 2008b: 110). In some cases, rather than formulating public policy 
through the constitutionally required process, some presidents would subvert the process by 
issuing press releases from the presidential palace announcing new policies. This method of 
governance bolsters the “hegemonic presidency” by making the president the sole determinant of 
policymaking, even where legislative action is legally required. 
Further, the “hegemonic presidency” operates through the patronage system. Using 
presidential control of the state’s financial, material, and logistical resources, including the 
awarding of contracts, and vast appointive powers, the “hegemonic presidency” is able to 
dispense largess through neopatrimonial networks at various levels of the society (Bach, 2011). 
In effect, the “hegemonic president” is analogous to a “Tammany Boss,” who dispenses largess 
as the quid pro quo for support from the public and the members of the political class 
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(Lowenkopf, 1976). The resulting dependent relationship between the president, the patron, on 
the one hand, and his lieutenants and ordinary citizens, on the other, enables the “hegemonic 
presidency” to thrive. This is because public officials and citizens alike make the determination 
that their continual access to state resources is dependent upon the personal whims and caprices 
of the president. Hence, being pliant in allowing the president to exercise unchecked powers is 
indispensable to their economic survival.  
 
The Axles 
Generally, the “hegemonic presidency” in Africa is propelled by several interlocking axles or 
drivers. The political culture is a major propellant of the phenomenon. Since the post-colonial 
era, the emergent dominant societal ideas and beliefs have supported the existence of the 
“hegemonic presidency” for a variety of reasons, including, as has been discussed, the need for a 
strong president as the promoter of national integration, unity, and development. Further, there is 
the expectation that the president would use state resources to dispense largesse. Interestingly, in 
the age of democratic governance and its emphasis, in part, on accountability and transparency, a 
dialectical tension has developed between the mass expectation for the continuation of 
presidential patronage and the need to fight corruption and promote meritocracy. 
Another driver, as has been discussed, is the constitutional design/constitutional re-
engineering process. Under this situation, the tentacles of the “hegemonic presidency” have been 
spread even more broadly into various policy domains. Ultimately, this has provided the legal 
foundation for the continual existence of the phenomenon. In addition, even the so-called 
“democratic-minded” individuals, who have occupied the presidency, and continue to do so, use 
the constitutional foundation of the phenomenon for its continuation as a fixture on the African 
political landscape—the claim of only exercising the powers that the constitution invests in the 
office.  
Weak public institutions are among the major enablers of the “hegemonic presidency.” 
The crux of the problem is that the legislative and judicial branches, as well as other public 
institutions, are not strong enough to serve as countervailing forces to the “imperial presidency.” 
Several reasons account for this. In the case of the legislature, there is still the enduring practice, 
despite the “third wave of democratization,” for presidents to exercise enormous influence in 
choosing the candidates for the ruling party. For example, during the Obasanjo presidency, he 
used his control of the machinery of the ruling PDP to choose the party’s candidates for the 
National Assembly, although primary elections were held (The Nation, 2007). Given the 
prevalence of election rigging, it was easy for President Obasanjo’s handpicked candidates to 
“win” the PDP’s nominations for the various legislative seats (Omotola, 2010). Subsequently, 
the legislators from the PDP became beholden to President Obasanjo for their political survival. 
Hence, they work to ensure that the National Assembly became a handmaid of the president. 
Also, given the unbridled control that the president exercises over state resources, legislators are 
therefore dependent upon the president for the primitive accumulation of wealth. For example, 
some of the members of the National Legislature of Liberia, who had worked to ensure the 
continuation of the “hegemonic presidency,” subsequently complained that the president failed to 
meet her end of the bargain by her failure to deliver the promised largesse to them (Pekin, 2011). 
Similarly, in the case of the judiciary, since judges are appointed by the president, and can be 
easily removed from office if they offend the president, they (the judges) are therefore reluctant 
to challenges the excesses of the “hegemonic presidency.”  
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  Moreover, the “hegemonic presidency” continues to thrive because of legislative 
acquiescence and abdication of responsibilities. For example, in Zimbabwe, under the 
Presidential Powers Act, the president is authorized to unilaterally declare an emergency and rule 
by decree and cancel any law (Mawere, 2012:1). Also, in Ghana, one of the “crown jewels” of 
the democratization project on the continent, the president can unilaterally create state agencies 
and appoint the mayors of cities (Prempeh, 2008a; Prempeh, 2008b). As has been discussed, the 
control that presidents exercise over the machinery of the ruling party and state resources gives 
him or her enormous leverage over legislators both from the ruling and opposition parties. 
  Another critical axle is presidential control over state financial, material, and logistical 
resources. As has been discussed, the president not only controls the allocation of resources to 
the legislature, the judiciary, and other public institutions, but exercises enormous discretionary 
powers in expending public resources without legislative approval. In this vein, the “hegemonic 
president” decides the access to resources, both in terms of public institutions and individual 
office holders, including opposition legislators. In the case of the latter, given the centrality of 
the agency of the state to the primitive accumulation of wealth, it is the president who decides 
which public officials would have access to state resources and those who would not. Thus, the 
state becomes analogous to a “buffet service” in which the “hegemonic president” decides which 
public officials “eat,” and those who do not (Kieh, 2009a:10). Interestingly, this has led several 
opposition legislators in various countries, like Liberia, to decamp to the ruling party (Pekin, 
2011). 
The expansive appointive power is a major axle that helps provides the “oxygen” that 
keeps the “hegemonic presidency” well and alive. Typically, the “hegemonic president” in 
Africa appoints a vast array of public officials in both the executive and judicial branches—
cabinet members, heads of state agencies, and judges, among others. As political appointees, 
these public officials then become reliant on presidential goodwill for holding these positions. 
Hence, the dominant survival strategy that these officials employ is to pander to the whims and 
caprices of the president. Even judges, who are supposed to be insulated from the “tugs and 
pulls” of politicking, are vulnerable to losing their positions, if they offend the “hegemonic 
president.” One of the major reasons is the lack of adequate and effective safeguards to protect 
them from being arbitrarily dismissed by the president.  
Despite the introduction of some democratic values and practices within some of the 
ruling political parties, the “hegemonic president” still exercises unchecked powers over their 
machineries. Even if party primaries are held, for example, to choose legislative candidates, as 
has been discussed, the president remains the major determinant of the outcomes. In this vein, 
those candidates who are preferred by the “hegemonic presidency” usually emerge as the 
“winners.”  
To make matters worse, the opposition political parties in Africa are generally weak, and, 
therefore, ineffective as additional sources of checks on the “hegemonic presidency.” The major 
reason is that these parties lack adequate financial, material, and logistical resources. 
Characteristically, the situation is made worse by “hegemonic presidencies” taking steps to 
ensure that opposition parties are deprived of resources. Specifically, the tactics of the 
“hegemonic presidency” and the ruling party include preventing private sources from assisting 
opposition political parties. The major resulting effect is that opposition parties lack the capacity 
to mobilize public support for the performance of their “checks” function. The prospects for 
opposition parties effectively performing their role as countervailing forces is made worse by the 
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common practice of major leaders of opposition parties joining the ruling parties in search of 
personal economic, political, and social opportunities (Pekin, 2011). 
External powers also serve as major drivers for the continuing existence of the 
“hegemonic presidency.” Despite their pro-democracy rhetoric and the attendant support for 
democratic governance, major global powers, like the United States, have, and continue, to 
support the “hegemonic presidency” in various African states, even in democratizing ones. The 
primary reason is that the major global powers realize that their foreign policy agendas in Africa 
are at times antithetical to the general interests and welfare of the citizens of Africa. Therefore, in 
order to implement their agendas, both on the continent as a whole, and especially within 
specific African states, these major powers need “hegemonic presidents.” 
 
The “Caging” of the “Hegemonic Presidency” in Africa:” Some Suggestions 
What steps need to be taken to help cage the “hegemonic presidency” in Africa? Broadly, efforts 
need to be made to address the axles or drivers of the “hegemonic presidency” and their adverse 
effects on democratic governance. The overarching measure that is required is the democratic 
reconstitution of the post-colonial African state (Kieh, 2009b). This should be a comprehensive 
and transformative process that transcends the realm of reforms. The transformation of the 
“hegemonic presidency” should be a major goal of the process. This would include the 
demystification of the office and the re-allocation of powers that are necessary for performing 
the responsibilities. 
  One of the specific steps would be for African states to rethink, for the purpose of 
changing, those aspects of their political cultures that help promote the “hegemonic presidency.” 
For example, the mythology of the imperative of the “strong man” or “strong woman” as the 
levers of national integration, unity, and national development needs to be thoroughly debunked 
through the process or re-socialization. Similarly, the mass expectation that the president should 
dispense largesse from the public coffers should be thoroughly discouraged and portrayed as a 
major contributor to corruption and mass abject poverty. 
Another step that is needed relates to limiting the powers of the presidency as part of the 
much-needed process of constitutional re-engineering. The ostensible purpose would be to 
eliminate the constitutional foundation of the phenomenon. That is, by curbing the expanse of 
presidential powers, constitutional re-design would provide the motor force for ending the 
“hegemonic presidency” in the various African states. 
Linked to the process of constitutional re-design should be the rethinking of the functions 
of the legislature and other public institutions. The central purpose should be to give them 
additional functions and the mechanisms for effectively serving as checks on the presidency. One 
key area should be the process of determining the allocation of resources. The legislature should 
be made the ultimate determinant. Also, it should be made illegal for the president to spend 
public funds that have not been approved by the legislature. In fact, it should be made an 
impeachable offense. In order for the legislature and other state institutions to play their roles 
effectively, they should be allotted adequate financial, material, logistical, and human resources. 
Another measure should be to make it illegal for the legislature to transfer any of its 
constitutionally assigned powers to the presidency. There should be a constitutional provision 
that would make such an action automatically illegal and, therefore, null and void. This will help 
address the enduring challenge of the legislature abdicating a function by allowing the president 
to perform it. 
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The curbing of the expansive appointive powers of the president should be a major step. 
One of the major ways to approach this would be to establish a smaller cluster of political 
appointees, while simultaneously increasing the size of the merit-based professional civil service. 
The resulting independence of the merit-based civil service would be a key instrument in helping 
to curb the excesses of the presidency. 
The democratization of the ruling parties would constitute a major challenge, especially 
the primaries for choosing candidates for various public offices. In this case, the primary 
responsibility would fall on the members of the ruling parties, especially those candidates who 
are not favored by the president. Specifically, the latter group would need to work to ensure that 
the totality of the party primaries, among other things, is democratized, especially ensuring that 
the results reflect the true choices of party members and not the president. 
Similarly, opposition parties would need to be democratized as well. In addition, steps 
need to be taken to help mobilize financial, material, human, and logistical resources that would 
help these parties to effectively play their roles in checking on the regime in power by, among 
other things, providing alternative policies on a regular and consistent basis, both during and 
after elections. Further, as part of the process of democratizing opposition parties, internal 
mechanisms need to be established that would help hold party members in the legislature 
accountable. 
Addressing the support of external powers, especially major global powers, for the 
“hegemonic presidency” would be the most formidable challenge in the efforts to end the 
phenomenon. This is because it is outside of the purview of the citizens of African states, their 
civil society organizations, and even the African Peer Review Mechanism. However, one 
possible step could be to make efforts to draw the attention of these major global powers to the 
importance of matching their pro-democracy rhetoric with practice, and the resulting 
implications for their prestige. 
 
Conclusion 
Although pre-colonial African polities had the chieftaincy as the fulcrum of executive power, the 
institution was generally checked by a council of elders and other institutions that helped ensure 
both “horizontal” and “vertical” accountability. Hence, although the post-colonial “hegemonic 
presidency” is anchored on the idea of the institution of the chieftaincy, the former did not adapt 
the constraints that were imposed on the latter. Accordingly, in functional terms, the roots of the 
“hegemonic presidency” in Africa lie in the colonial state and its administrative structure in 
which the governor-general had unchecked executive, legislative, and judicial powers. In other 
words, the “hegemonic presidency” is the replica of the governor-generalship during the colonial 
period. 
Operationally, the phenomenon is powered by the confluence of both the legal authority 
granted the president under the constitution and statutes of an African state, as well as the abuse 
of the authority. In the case of the latter, for example, it is quite common for “hegemonic 
presidents” to abuse their authority by plundering and pillaging the national treasury and 
asphyxiating the exercise of constitutionally guaranteed political rights and civil liberties, such as 
the freedoms of association, assembly, and speech. 
Finally, while political liberalization and democratic transitions are important phases of 
the democratization project, they are not sufficient to occasion the caging of the “hegemonic 
presidency.” Instead, what is required is the democratic reconstitution of the post-colonial 
African state, including the transformation of the political culture, the public institutions, the 
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rules, and processes. Significantly, an informed, politically-conscious, civil-minded, and engaged 
citizenry is indispensable to this process. In order words, the citizens must set the boundaries 
within which the presidency and other public institutions would operate through, for example, 
sustained “vertical accountability.” 
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